

THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN FCT IN USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) AT NORFOLK, VA DURING THE PERIOD 26-30 MAR 07. THE SHIP COULD NOT CONDUCT THE AT SEA PORTION OF THE FCT RESULTING IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL TRIAL.

2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:

A. THE SHIP WAS UNABLE TO ACHIEVE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE EQUIPMENT FOR UNDERWAY OPERATIONS BY 2000 DAY TWO OF THE TRIAL. SPECIFICALLY, MINIMUM EQUIPMENT FOR STEERING, REVERSE OSMOSIS (RO) UNITS, LOW PRESSURE AIR COMPRESSORS (LPACS), AIR CONDITIONING UNITS (AC), AND FIRE PUMPS WERE NOT ACHIEVED. EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE TO CLEAR MINIMUM EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARIES PRIOR TO THE 0600 SAIL TIME ON DAY

3. THE FCT TRANSITIONED TO AN UNSUCCESSFUL TRIAL STATUS AT 0900 ON DAY 3. THE STEERING SYSTEM WAS UNRELIABLE AND CONTINUED TROUBLESHOOTING ON BOTH STEERING UNITS RESULTED IN CASCADING CONTROL SYSTEM CASUALTIES. THE SHIP RE-DEMONSTRATED THE STEERING SYSTEMS AT 1230 ON DAY 5.

STEERING CHECKS COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PORT AND STARBOARD RUDDER LIMIT STOP CHECKS ON BOTH UNITS WHICH DID NOT MEET PMS TOLERANCES. ADDITIONALLY, THE PORT UNIT SERVO PRESSURE WAS LOW. THE TRIAL CONTINUED INPORT ON DAY 3 WITH GOAL OF COMPLETING AS MUCH OF THE POST-UNDERWAY/OPEN AND INSPECT PHASE AS POSSIBLE, IDENTIFYING THOSE AREAS NOT COMPLETED AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHAT AREAS MUST BE CORRECTED, RE-INSPECTED, AND DEMONSTRATED AT SEA TO COMPLETE A SUCCESSFUL FCT AS DETAILED REF A.

A RE-TRIAL (OR MATERIAL INSPECTION) IS REQUIRED IN LPD 17 AND WILL BE COORDINATED WITH TYCOM. THE SHIP IS SCHEDULED FOR POST SHAKEDOWN AVAILABILITY (PSA) 2 APR 07 TO 15 JUN 07 (90 DAY DOCKING AVAILABILITY).

B. THE MEN AND WOMEN OF USS SAN ANTONIO PROFESSIONALLY PRESENTED THEIR SHIP TO THE BOARD. OVERALL, THE SHIP WAS CLEAN. STOWAGE HOWEVER, WAS INADEQUATE THROUGHOUT AND PROPERLY SECURING THE SHIP FOR SEA REQUIRED EMPHASIS.

C. DELIVERED IN JUL 05, USS SAN ANTONIO REMAINS AN UNFINISHED SHIP. 138 OF 943 SPACES ARE UNFINISHED AND ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATES OF THESE SPACES COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. ELECTRICAL WORK REMAINS UNFINISHED THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. NUMEROUS DEAD-ENDED COILED CABLES WERE OBSERVED IN OVERHEADS AWAITING ROUTING FOR FUTURE EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM INSTALLATIONS. AN ENERGIZED, DEAD-ENDED CABLE WAS DISCOVERED ON TOP OF LOCKER 36 IN OPERATIONS BERTHING COMPARTMENT. SAFETY CONCERNS ARE ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT THAT RELATE TO SAFETY OF PERSONNEL, SAFETY OF EQUIPMENT, SAFE AMMO HANDLING, SAFE NAVIGATION, AND SAFETY OF FLIGHT. ALL SAFETY DEFICIENCIES THAT CAN BE CORRECTED NEAR TERM SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY SHIPS FORCE AND/OR THE PROGRAM OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

D. THE COMMANDING OFFICERS (CO) LETTER OF CONCERNS TO PRESINSURV LISTED 108 MATERIAL AND LOGISTICS DEFICIENCIES WHICH HE FELT WERE SIGNIFICANT. 53 OF 108 OF THESE DEFICIENCIES LISTED NO CLEAR PATH FOR CORRECTION OR RESOLUTION. 6 MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES WERE IDENTIFIED AS FLEET MAINTENANCE ISSUES. THE SHIPBUILDER WARRANTY

PERIOD FOR USS SAN ANTONIO EXPIRED IN APR 06. MOST SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT.

E. SERIOUS MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN THE WELL DECK, VEHICLE STOWAGE AREAS, AND WITH WATER PRODUCTION. REVERSE OSMOSIS (RO) UNITS CONTINUE AS ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLED SYSTEMS ONBOARD AND OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY HAS FAILED TO MEET EXPECTATIONS. ALL THREE RO UNITS WERE CASREP. NR 1 RO UNIT WAS OUT OF COMMISSION (OOC), NR 3 RO UNIT WAS DEGRADED AND REPORTED TO BE UNABLE TO PRODUCE TO CAPACITY, AND NR 2 RO UNIT WAS OPERATIONAL BUT UNRELIABLE. CONSTANT VOYAGE REPAIRS AND NUMEROUS CANNIBALIZATION EFFORTS HAVE FAILED TO KEEP THE UNITS RUNNING AT OR NEAR CAPACITY. IN THEIR CURRENT CONDITION THEY WILL NOT SUPPORT EMBARKED TROOPS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS AT SEA. 2 OF 3 VEHICLE RAMPS WERE INOPERATIVE (INOP). 14 OF 20 EXHAUST FANS IN WELL DECK AND VEHICLE STOWAGE AREAS WERE INOP, 26 OF 26 VEHICLE EXHAUST HOSE EXTENSIONS WERE NOT ONBOARD. THE SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF THE EXHAUST SYSTEM IN THESE AREAS POSES A SERIOUS PERSONNEL SAFETY RISK FOR MARINES SERVICING AND/OR EMPLOYING WHEELED AND TRACKED VEHICLES IN SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE SHIP WILL BE UNABLE TO CONDUCT RAM AND MK 46 30 MM GUN WEAPON SYSTEM (GWS) RELOAD AT SEA BECAUSE OF OBSTRUCTED AMMO HANDLING ROUTES, DEFICIENCIES WITH J-BAR DAVITS, AND THE BOAT AND CARGO CRANE.

F. THE OVERHEAD PAINT SCHEME IN THE AFT WELL DECK HAD FAILED AND SHOULD NOT BE CORRECTED UNTIL OOC EXHAUST FANS IN THIS AREA ARE OPERATIONAL. APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF TOPSIDE NON-SKID DECK COATINGS PRESENTED RUST BLEED THROUGH WITH SOME AREAS EXHIBITING BARE METAL. AREAS OF TOTAL FAILURE REVEALED INADEQUATE BASE METAL PREPARATION PRIOR TO NON-SKID APPLICATION TO INCLUDE LITTLE TO NO BASE PRIMER COAT APPLIED.

G. THE MAGNITUDE OF DEFICIENCIES OBSERVED WITH THE SHIPWIDE AREA NETWORK (SWAN) SYSTEM NEGATIVELY IMPACTS COMMAND, CONTROL, AND EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE AREAS. IN ADDITION TO ADMINISTRATIVE NETWORKS, SWAN PROVIDES FOR SHIP CONTROL AND NAVIGATION, ENGINEERING PLANT OPERATIONS, DAMAGE CONTROL MANAGEMENT, AS WELL AS COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF MANAGING THE BATTLE PICTURE. SWAN MUST BE REFRESHED WITH MORE ROBUST, SUPPORTABLE, AND SUSTAINABLE HARDWARE SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY OF THIS BACKBONE NETWORK SYSTEM.

H. REDUCED EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCY AND DEGRADED MATERIAL CONDITION OF GALLEY FOOD PREPARATION AND SCULLERY EQUIPMENT HAMPERS THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE FOOD SERVICE SUPPORT TO THE CREW AND EMBARKED MARINES AT SEA.

I. INSURV REQUESTED CANNIBALIZATION AND DIVERSION ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE START OF THE TRIAL. PMS 317 FURNISHED THE OPEN SO12 LIST WITH 25 DIVERSION LINE ITEMS (MOSTLY FOR RO UNIT SUPPORT). INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS) REMAINS PROBLEMATIC FOR THE CLASS AND CAN BE DESCRIBED AS MARGINAL AT BEST.

J. WHEN STARTING NR 1 MAIN REDUCTION GEAR (MRG) ELECTRIC STANDBY LUBE OIL PUMPS IN FAST OR SLOW, THE MRG LUBE OIL INLET PRESSURE FLUCTUATED BETWEEN 27 AND 34 PSIG. SHIPS FORCE VENTED THE STANDBY

LUBE OIL PUMPS AT THE MRG FILTER/STRAINER ASSEMBLY, AND THE MRG LUBE OIL INLET PRESSURE STEADIED AT 30 PSIG. SHIP REPORTS BOTH MRG LUBE OIL SYSTEMS HAVE HAD A HISTORY OF LUBE OIL PRESSURE UNRELIABILITY SINCE SHIP DELIVERY, TO INCLUDE WATCH STANDER IMMEDIATE CASUALTY CONTROLLING ACTIONS TO STOP AND LOCK SHAFTS DUE TO LOW LO HEADER PRESSURE (DEPARTURE FROM SPECS (DFS), TEMPORARY STANDING ORDER (TSO).

K. 2 OF 2 MRGS HAD SIGHT FLOW INDICATORS THAT DID NOT CONFORM TO PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IAW NSTM 241. ADDITIONALLY, SHIP SPEC LPD 17 SECT 241 STATES: MRG SECURITY LOCKING DEVICES TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO THE GEAR CASE AND PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR SIGHT FLOW INDICATORS AND PIPING FLANGES WHICH HAVE FOUR BOLTS OR LESS SHALL BE PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACTOR FOR EACH MRG UNIT.

L. SHIPS FORCE WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE MRG DEHUMIDIFIER AIR FLOW RATES IAW PMS (2411/007, R-1) BECAUSE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED TEST EQUIPMENT.

M. WHEN CONDUCTING MRG LUBE OIL SEQUENCING FOR NR 1 AND 2 MRG ELECTRIC STANDBY LUBE OIL PUMPS AT 20 PLUS-OR-MINUS 1 PSIG, THE LEAD PUMP SHIFTED FROM LOW SPEED TO THE OFF POSITION FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 3 SECONDS AND THEN THE LEAD PUMP SHIFTED TO HIGH SPEED. THE LEAD PUMP SHOULD HAVE SHIFTED FROM LOW SPEED TO HIGH SPEED WITH NO PAUSE (DFS).

N. SHIPS STEERING GEAR SYSTEM WAS UNRELIABLE. BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD STEERING UNITS CYCLED ON AND OFF ERRATICALLY UPON INITIAL UNIT STARTUP AND WHEN RUDDER WAS POSITIONED AMIDSHIPS AFTER THE BLOCKING VALVE TEST (STBD CORRECTED). ON DAY 5, INSURV VERIFIED OPERATION OF BOTH UNITS AND THE UNCOMMANDED STARTING AND STOPPING OF BOTH UNITS DID NOT REOCCUR. STBD UNIT REQUIRED THE REPLACEMENT OF TWO CIRCUIT CARDS. THE OEM SUSPECTS THE COMPUTER HARD DRIVE MAY HAVE BEEN CORRUPTED. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CASUALTY ON PORT UNIT WAS NOT DETERMINED. ADDITIONALLY, PORT AND STBD STEERING CONTROL LIMIT STOP SETTINGS WERE OUT-OF-SPEC. PORT LIMIT STOPS ALLOWED RUDDER TRAVEL TO GO TO 36.5 DEGREES LEFT AND 34.5 DEGREES RIGHT. STBD LIMIT STOPS ALLOWED RUDDER TRAVEL TO GO TO 36 DEGREES LEFT AND 34.5 DEGREES RIGHT (BUILDER SPEC IS 35 DEGREES PLUS ONE-HALF, MINUS ZERO DEGREES).

O. SHIPS AIR CONDITIONING CAPABILITIES WERE DEGRADED. NR 1 AC PLANT WAS OOC (CASREP 07015). 2 OF 7 AC PLANTS CLEARED FOR OPERATION DURING THE TRIAL. 5 OF 7 AC PLANTS HAD REPAIR BEFORE OPERATE (RBO) DEFICIENCIES THAT REMAINED UNCORRECTED.

P. INPORT CHECKS OF RO UNITS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED BECAUSE RBO DEFICIENCIES REMAINED UNCORRECTED. DESIGN, SAFETY, AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES REMAIN WITH THE UNITS. NR 2 RO DUMP VALVE COULD NOT BE SAFELY ACCESSED BECAUSE THE RO UNIT WAS INSTALLED FLUSH WITH A LADDER WELL AND CREATED A FALL HAZARD. 3-INCHES OF WATER WAS PRESENT IN TROUGHS UNDER RO UNITS BECAUSE OF NO DRAIN FOR WATER REMOVAL. HIGH PRESSURE PUMP OIL DRAIN PLUGS WERE INACCESSIBLE FOR PMS OIL CHANGE OUT. NR 1 RO WAS CASREP (06044) FOR THE HIGH PRESSURE PUMP, BUT OTHER COMPONENTS WERE CANNIBALIZED (BRINE PUMP) TO REPAIR NR 2 OR 3 RO UNITS DUE TO LONG LEAD-TIME ON RO PARTS. ALL

RO UNITS HAD EXPOSED BARE ELECTRICAL WIRING PROTRUDING FROM PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS.

Q. CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATORS AND DUMBWAITERS WERE UNSAFE TO OPERATE BECAUSE OF SAFETY, DESIGN, AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES. TRUNK DOOR HYDRAULIC PIPING WAS 1/2 INCH VICE 3/4 INCH AS REQUIRED BY MFG PRINTS AND DOOR TIMINGS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED WITH CURRENT INSTALLATION. TRUNK DOOR ASSEMBLIES WERE NOT INSTALLED IAW INSTALL PRINTS. HOIST WIRE ROPE GUARDS WERE NOT REMOVABLE, PREVENTING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SLACK ROPE SWITCH PMS. NUMEROUS OTHER IN-SERVICE LIMIT (ISL) DEFICIENCIES WERE OBSERVED.

R. ALTHOUGH VAST IMPROVEMENTS WERE NOTED SINCE ACCEPTANCE TRIALS, SIGNIFICANT ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC CABLE PLANT INSTALLATION DEFICIENCIES REMAIN THROUGHOUT AND ARE BEYOND SHIPS FORCE CAPABILITY TO CORRECT. DEAD-ENDED CABLES, CABLES IMPROPERLY BUNDLED AND BANDED, CABLES EXCEEDING NESTING CAPACITY, INADEQUATE SUPPORT BRACKETS, IMPROPER BANDING MATERIAL (PLASTIC CABLE TIES), AND LOOSE COILED CABLES FOR FUTURE INSTALLS REMAIN UNCORRECTED.

S. ADVANCED AUTOMATIC DEGAUSSING/MAGNETIC SIGNATURE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED (STARRED ITEM).

T. 116 OF 116 SPEAKER GROUPS IN THE FWD 1MC AMPLIFIER RACK AND 91 OF 91 SPEAKER GROUPS IN THE AFT 1MC AMPLIFIER RACK HAD INDUCED VOLTAGES (3-10VAC) AND COULD NOT BE TESTED FOR GROUNDS (CASREP 06002).

U. ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS) TO ELECTRIC PLANT COMMAND SEQUENCING ERRORS DID NOT ALLOW WATCH STANDERS TO TRANSFER TO AND FROM SHORE POWER AS DESIGNED. CURRENTLY SHIPS FORCE IS REQUIRED TO MANIPULATE SHIP CONTROL SIGNALS TO SETUP AND TRANSFER TO AND FROM SHORE POWER. THE PROGRAM OFFICE REPORTS ESTIMATED DELIVERY DATE OF THE CAE/RAYTHEON ECS SOFTWARE REVISION TO CORRECT THE SHORE POWER TRANSFER LOGIC PROBLEM AS UNKNOWN.

V. 3 OF 3 SPECIAL FREQUENCY CONVERSION SYSTEMS (SFCS) WOULD NOT OPERATE IN PARALLEL (CASREP 07007).

W. AFT IMPRESSED CURRENT CATHODIC PROTECTION (ICCP) POWER SUPPLIES WERE DE-ENERGIZED DURING 10 OCT 06 TO 15 FEB 07 WITH NO EXPLANATION PROVIDED. DURING THIS LAPSE OF ICCP OPERATION, NO CORROSION PROTECTION WAS BEING PROVIDED TO THE AFT ZONES OF THE SHIPS HULL TO INCLUDE SHAFTS AND RUDDERS.

X. INSTALLATION OF THE COLLECTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM (CPS) WAS INCOMPLETE WITH FINAL INSTALL AND TESTING PLANNED FOR PSA (STARRED ITEM). ZONE PRESSURIZATION WAS NOT ACHIEVED IN 4 OF 4 CPS ZONES. 45 PART 1 SAFETY DEFICIENCIES AND 39 PART 1 OTHER DEFICIENCIES WERE SCRIBED FOR CPS AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS. 35 OF 49 AIRLOCKS HAD AT LEAST ONE DOOR WITH AN INOP DOOR SAFETY LATCH AND SIX AIRLOCKS HAD 2 OF 2 DOORS WITH INOP DOOR SAFETY LATCHES. THIS POSES A SAFETY HAZARD TO PERSONNEL FROM ZONE PRESSURE AGAINST THE QUICK ACTING WATERTIGHT DOORS (QAWTDS). WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY IS DEGRADED BY NUMEROUS NON-TIGHT MULTI-CABLE TRANSITS (STARRED ITEM) AND WIRE-WAY PENETRATIONS BETWEEN SPACES, IMPROPER STUFFING TUBE PACKING BETWEEN

LEVELS AND DECKS, TWO FAILED BULKHEAD SHAFT SEALS ON THE STARBOARD SHAFT (DFS 0306, DFS 0506), AND INTERIOR WATERTIGHT CLOSURES (119 OF 236 CLOSURES WERE NOT WATERTIGHT, DOORS, HATCHES, SCUTTLES) THAT FAIL PMS WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY CHECKS. 92 INTERIOR QAWTDS, MANUFACTURED BY RAILWAY CORPORATION, REQUIRE TOTAL REPLACEMENT BECAUSE THE KNIFE EDGES ARE BELOW THE NAVSEA STANDARD MINIMUM HEIGHT REQUIREMENT AND THE DOORS LACK ADDITIONAL DOG ADJUSTMENT. 33 OF 35 EXTERIOR MAFO HOLKAMP DOORS WERE INSPECTED AND 5 FAILED CHALK TEST. COLLECTIVELY, INTERNAL WATERTIGHT CLOSURE DEFICIENCIES THROUGHOUT THE SHIP DEGRADE THE ABILITY TO SET PRESCRIBED MATERIAL CONDITION OF READINESS.

Y. MAIN AND SECONDARY DRAINAGE SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED AND HAD DEFICIENCIES THAT INCLUDED 1 OF 1 STBD SHAFT ALLEY BILGE SUCTION VALVE INOP REMOTELY (TSO), 5 OF 5 MAIN DRAINAGE EDUCTOR FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVE REMOTE OPERATORS INOP, AND DISCONNECTED (STARRED ITEM) (CASREP 06050) (DFS) (TSO). MANY LOCAL VALVE WHEELS ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ONE PERSON TO OPEN OR CLOSE. IN THE EVENT OF PROGRESSIVE FLOODING, THE SHIP WOULD BE CHALLENGED TO EFFECTIVELY DEWATER THE AFFECTED SPACES. MAIN ENGINEERING SPACE (UPPER LEVEL) REMOTE REACH RODS, USED TO OPERATE THE MAIN DRAINAGE EDUCTORS, ARE UNIVERSALLY UNRELIABLE AND IN MOST CASES INOP. THE UPPER LEVEL REMOTE SYSTEM IS INEFFECTIVE AND THE TECHNICAL WARRANT HOLDER RECENTLY APPROVED PROPOSALS TO REMOVE THIS SYSTEM FROM THE SHIP CLASS DESIGN.

Z. WATERMIST FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM HAD ISSUES WITH CHLORIDE CORROSION OF PIPING, FITTINGS, AND WELD JOINTS. RECENT NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING RESULTS DETERMINED THAT SEVERAL AREAS DID NOT MEET MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS AND SHOULD BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED. FURTHER EVALUATION IS REQUIRED. CURRENTLY SHIPS FORCE IS TESTING POTABLE WATER FOR CHLORIDES PRIOR TO FILLING THE WATERMIST TANKS. A PERMANENT RESOLUTION IS REQUIRED FOR THE LONG TERM MAINTAINABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE SYSTEM.

AA. 124 OF 156 MK1 LIFE PRESERVERS WERE MISSING.

AB. HEAVY WEATHER LIFELINES WERE MISSING.

AC. BATTLE FORCE TACTICAL TRAINER (BFTT) HAD NOT COMPLETED SOVT.

AD. APX-72 IFF TRANSPONDER WAS OOC BECAUSE OF FAULTY RF CASE ASSEMBLY AND POWER SUPPLY.

AE. PORT AND STBD AN/SLQ-32 ANTENNA PLATFORMS HAD THE FOLLOWING SAFETY DEFICIENCIES: MISSING SAFETY RAILS, MISSING SECURING STAPLES FOR WORKING ALOFT, MISSING MAINTENANCE PLATFORMS FOR OUTBOARD SLQ-32 PANEL MAINTENANCE, AND STBD PLATFORM WAS MISSING NIGHT TIME LIGHTING FIXTURE.

AF. 3 OF 6 MK 174 NULKA PROCESSOR POWER SUPPLIES WERE MOUNTED ABOVE LADDER WELL CREATING A FALL HAZARD WHILE CONDUCTING MAINTENANCE.

AG. SPS-48 RADAR WAS OOC BECAUSE ELECTRONIC COOLING WATER HAD LOW RESISTIVITY (CORRECTED) AND LOW COOLANT FLOW TO FINAL STAGE PULSE TRANSFORMERS. INSURV OPEN AND INSPECT REVEALED COOLING WATER SYSTEM WAS FOULED BY DEBRIS FROM FAILED COATING ON PUMP IMPELLER AND CASING

(CASREP 07028).

AH. DOCUMENTATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO VERIFY SHIP SELF-DEFENSE SYSTEM (SSDS) MK 2 MOD 2 COMPUTER PROGRAM WAS CERTIFIED FOR TACTICAL USE (STARRED CARD).

AI. AFT ADVANCED ENCLOSED MAST SYSTEMS (AEMS) VERTICAL LADDER WAS UNSAFE TO OPERATE BECAUSE OF MULTIPLE DEFICIENCIES WITH CLIMBER CABLE SYSTEM. IT WAS UNSTABLE WHILE PERSONNEL WERE ASCENDING AND DESCENDING (STARRED CARD).

AJ. MK 137 NULKA LAUNCHER NIGHT TIME LOADING LIGHTS WERE NOT INSTALLED.

AK. DOPPLER SONAR VELOCITY LOG (DSVL) INSTALLATION, TESTING, AND CALIBRATION WERE INCOMPLETE (STARRED CARD).

AL. THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS STARRED DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING AT, REPORTED AS CORRECTED, REMAIN OPEN AS DEFICIENCIES (4 TOTAL):

-MK 46 30MM GUN SYSTEM LACKED ILS SUPPORT TO INCLUDE REQUIRED ONBOARD REPAIR PARTS AND FINALIZED ALLOWANCE PARTS LISTS, AEL, AND PMS. INTERIM PARTS SUPPORT CONTINUES TO BE PROVIDED BY ISEA VICE NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEM.

-AMMO HANDLING ROUTES COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED. GEAR WAS EITHER UNUSABLE OR NOT INSTALLED THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. HANDLING ROUTES (AS IDENTIFIED IN NAVSEA DWG NO 7318269) REMAIN UNDEMONSTRATED BECAUSE RAM J-BAR DAVIT AND REDESIGNED 30MM AMMO J-BAR DAVITS WILL NOT SUPPORT HANDLING REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINERIZED RAM AND 30MM AMMO. PASSAGEWAY (1-34-1-L) HAD MANY RAMPS/BRIDGES THAT WERE DAMAGED AND/OR MISSING PIECES. A FIRE STATION (FIREPLUG 1-54-1) AND VENTILATION SYSTEM MUST BE DISASSEMBLED (TP SUPPLY SYSTEM 03-59-1) INORDER TO CLEAR PASSAGEWAY OBSTRUCTIONS. BOAT AND CARGO CRANE INSULATION LINK, REQUIRED FOR SAFE ORDNANCE HANDLING OPERATIONS, IS THE WRONG TYPE AND DOES NOT FIT THE CRANE HAULING ASSEMBLY.

-AMMO ROUTES AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT HAVE YET TO BE SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATED. ADDITIONALLY, THE LACK OF 30MM READY SERVICE LOCKERS PREVENTED AMMO STOWAGE IN SUPPORT OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE MK 46 GUNS NEAR THE MOUNTS.

-NIXIE EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED, PORT FIBER OPTIC TRANSMISSION (FOTC) CABLE IS OOC, SYSTEM REQUIRES DEMONSTRATION UNDERWAY FOR INSURV (STARRED CARD).

AM. NAVIGATION CERTIFICATION WAS INCOMPLETE.

AN. NAVSSI BLOCK 3 BUILD 4 DATA CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (DCS) WAS INOP BECAUSE OF COMMUNICATION FAILURE BETWEEN HARD DRIVE AND RAID DRIVE, UNSTABLE INPUT POWER PREVENTED ACCURATE MONITORING OF NAV DATA, AND NO NAVSSI WORK STATION HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN PILOT HOUSE.

AO. 2 OF 4 SIGNAL SEARCHLIGHT RECEPTACLE AND POWER SWITCHES WERE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE AS THEY WERE POSITIONED DEEP WITHIN A VOID BEHIND A QUICK ACCESS DOOR ON BRIDGE WINGS. 1 OF 4 SEARCHLIGHTS ACCESS PLATE REQUIRED REMOVAL OF RETAINING SCREWS TO ACCESS POWER SWITCH.

2 OF 4 LIGHT CORDS WERE PULLED FROM PLUG WITH EXPOSED WIRES.

AP. CSOSS DID NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT CONFIGURATION OF SHIPS NAVIGATION INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION.

AQ. DIGITAL FLUXGATE MAGNETIC COMPASS (DFGMC) (MODEL MV103AC) WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPS DEGAUSSING SYSTEM. ERRATIC OR INACCURATE SHIPS HEADING INFORMATION FROM THE DFGMC CAN LEAD BRIDGE PERSONNEL IN STEERING AN INCORRECT COURSE.

AR. DFGMC, VOYAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AN/UQN-4 (FATHOMETER), AN/WSN-7, NAVSSI, AND DSVL SOVTS COULD NOT BE VERIFIED AS COMPLETED.

AS. SHIPS WIRELESS PORTABLE INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (WPICS) LACKED LOGISTICS SUPPORT, SHIP DID NOT HAVE SYSTEM DIAGRAMS TO VALIDATE CORRECT INSTALLATION, SOVT WAS INCOMPLETE, RADIO COVERAGE WAS NOT ADEQUATE, AND 2 OF 2 UPS WERE INOP. SYSTEM RADIATING TRANSMISSION LINE (RTL) NEEDED TESTING TO VALIDATE DESIGN AND INSTALLATION PROCEDURES IAW NAVSEA DRAWING 409-7408432 REV B.

AT. AN/USC-38 EHF WAVEGUIDE HAD A 2 INCH CLEARANCE VIOLATION BETWEEN WAVEGUIDE AND LIGHTING FIXTURE/CABLES IN NUMEROUS SPACES (REF: NIMB PARAGRAPH 5-2.1.4). HANGER SPACING WAS GREATER THAN 4 INCHES IN SOME AREAS (REF: AN/USC-38(V)2 RF TRANSMISSION LINE DIAGRAM 807-7029896, NOTE 4.4). PORT WAVEGUIDE IN ATHWARTSHIP PASSAGEWAY (03-63-0-L) WAS SCRATCHED AND NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED.

AU. PORT FORWARD WSC-6 ANTENNA WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF MULTIPLE GOUGES CAUSED BY STRIKING A WELDED HAND GRAB INSIDE THE RADOME WHEN ROTATING (CORRECTED).

AV. EMI TESTING WAS INCOMPLETE. SHIP REQUIRED THE FOLLOWING EMI FIXES: COTS RADAR SPS-73 DID NOT CONTAIN AN EMI FIX (ANTENNA EMI GASKET) AND DIGITAL FLUX GATE COMPASS HAD INCORRECT EMI FIX INSTALLED. FURUNO RADAR WAS UNABLE TO BE BLANKED BY AN/SLA-10B BECAUSE NO PRE-TRIGGER KIT WAS AVAILABLE.

AW. EMP INSPECTION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: OF 500 TOPSIDE PENETRATIONS INSPECTED, 60 WERE IN CONDUIT AND GROUNDED AT THE BULKHEAD. SHIP IS REQUIRED TO HAVE 100 PERCENT TOPSIDE PENETRATIONS SHIELDED. 26 OF 60 CABLES IN CONDUIT WERE TESTED. 73 PERCENT FAILED TO MEET THE 60DB SHIELDING REQUIREMENT. CABLES THAT FAILED DURING THE AT ALSO FAILED DURING FCT. TWO CABLES THAT PASSED DURING THE AT FAILED DURING THE FCT.

AX. HF LINK 11, UHF LINK 11, SAT LINK 11, SAT LINK 16, AND LOS LINK 16 WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED BECAUSE NAVIGATION DATA WAS NOT FED TO CDLMS.

AY. 2 OF 3 KEY SWITCH INTEGRATED TERMINAL EQUIPMENT (KITE) PHONES (EXT 2343/2344 AND 2339/2340) DID NOT INDICATE RECEIVED TRANSMISSION WAS CIPHER OR PLAIN MODE.

AZ. AN/KSQ-1 INSTALLATION IS INCOMPLETE. STOP WORK WAS ISSUED TO INSTALL THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM, AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DIRECTION SYSTEM (AADS). AADS SOVT STATUS WAS NOT VERIFIABLE. KSQ-1 CABLE RIP-OUT

WAS INCOMPLETE LEAVING DEAD-ENDED CABLES IN THE OVERHEAD OF THE COMM CENTER. THE INCOMPLETE STATUS OF KSQ-1, AND NOT ITS REPLACEMENT AADS, WAS A STARRED ITEM FROM AT (STARRED CARD).

BA. SWAN SYSTEM HAS DEMONSTRATED A DECLINING TREND OF RELIABILITY BETWEEN BT, AT, AND FCT. 610 OF 652 ORIGINAL BT AND AT TRIAL CARDS WERE OPEN AT THE START OF FCT. SWAN HAS EXPERIENCED NUMEROUS FAILURES TO INCLUDE SERVER HARD DRIVES, TAPE DRIVES, PROCESSORS, NIC CARDS, AND SCSI CONTROLLER CARDS, RESULTING IN SWAN CRASHES. MORE RECENTLY, THERE WERE INCREASING NUMBERS OF NETWORK SWITCH COMPONENT FAILURES (3 OF 9 SIPR EDGE SWITCHES, 1 OF 4 SIPR CORE SWITCHES, 3 OF 24 NIPR EDGE SWITCHES) WITH REPLACEMENT PART LEAD TIMES FORECASTED TO AS LONG AS SIX MONTHS.

BB. SWAN IBUS SERVERS ARE COMPRISED OF LEGACY COMPONENTS DATING BACK TO 1998 INCLUDING PII 450 MHZ DUAL PROCESSOR DAUGHTER BOARDS PAIRED ON A COMMON BACKPLANE IN EACH CHASSIS TO FORM TWO LOGICAL DUAL PROCESSOR SERVERS EACH WITH TWO 18GB SCSI HARD DRIVES CONFIGURED IN A DATA MIRRORING SCHEME. THE IBUS WORKSTATIONS ARE THE SAME CONFIGURATION WITH ONE DUAL PROCESSOR DAUGHTER BOARD AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS REMOVED. THE SERVER MANUFACTURER IS OUT OF BUSINESS LEAVING LIFECYCLE SUPPORT CHALLENGING. CABLETRON 6500 SWITCH MANUFACTURER DISSOLVED OPERATIONS IN 2000. ENTERASYS BOUGHT OUT CABLETRONS HARDWARE LINE, ENDED PRODUCTION IN DEC 2000, AND DECLARED THE 6500 SMARTSWITCH END OF SERVICE LIFE IN 2004.

SUPPORTABILITY

SOLUTIONS FOR SWAN ARE OFTEN BUILD-TO-ORDER REPLACEMENT PARTS REFURBISHED BY SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES, AND ARE COSTLY.

BC. FOTC PLANT RELIABILITY WAS SUSPECT DUE TO NUMEROUS INSTALLATION DEFICIENCIES AND THOROUGH LINK LOSS TESTING WAS NOT COMPLETED. NUMEROUS FIBER OPTIC TRUNK BOXES REMAIN IMPROPERLY DRESSED, HAVE FIBER CABLES WITHOUT LABEL TAGS, AND CONTAIN CABLES WITH EXCESSIVE LENGTHS STUFFED INTO BOXES. DURING BUILDER TEST AND TRIALS, SWAN FIBER OPTIC CABLE PLANT LINK LOSS TESTING WAS NOT COMPLETED IN ITS ENTIRETY. SAMPLE TESTING WAS REPORTED AS BEING CONDUCTED, HOWEVER, TEST REPORTS WERE NOT PROVIDED.

BD. SWAN FAILOVER TESTING FAILED DURING BT AND AT AND WAS NOT CONDUCTED DURING FCT AS REQUIRED. THIS IS RELATED TO THE AT STARRED CARD CONCERNING THE INABILITY FOR ECS CONSOLES TO AUTOMATICALLY RESYNCHRONIZE FOLLOWING A LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS. FOLLOW ON LPD 17 CLASS SHIPS WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE FAILOVER TESTING DURING AT AND FCT.

BE. SWAN POWER SYSTEM HAD NO ALARM INDICATION FOR LOSS OF POWER. DURING FCT, LOSS OF POWER TO 4 SIPR SERVERS, 4 NIPR SWITCHES, AND 3 SIPR SWITCHES WENT UNNOTICED UNTIL PERSONNEL REPORTED LOSS OF SERVICES (AFTER ASSOCIATED UPS UNITS WERE DEPLETED). ON RESTORATION OF SHIPS POWER, THE UPS UNITS REQUIRED MANUAL RESET TO SHIPS POWER. POWER PANELS IN NODE ROOMS WERE MISCONFIGURED. BREAKERS WERE OVER OR UNDER RATED FOR LABELED LOADS IN 3 OF 4 NODE ROOMS. POWER PANELS WERE IMPROPERLY LABELED FOR EQUIPMENT SERVICED IN NODE ROOM 4. PANEL LABELED FOR ONE UPS SUPPLIED A SERVER CABINET. PANEL LABELED FOR ANOTHER UPS ACTUALLY SERVICED A DIFFERENT UPS.

BF. SWAN NETWORK ACCREDITATION WAS INVALID. INTERIM AUTHORITY TO OPERATE (IATO) SPECIFIED A CLASSIFIED WINDOWS NT-BASED NETWORK. THE SHIP HAS UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED (GENSER), AND SCI NETWORKS. THE USMC SUPPORT SERVERS WERE LOADED WITH WINDOWS 2003. SOME PC WORKSTATIONS WERE LOADED WITH WINDOWS 2000, OTHERS WERE LOADED WITH WINDOWS XP.

BG. GCCS-M INSTALLATION HAD A COMPLETED SOVT. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDE PROPER OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. 6 OF 13 PC AND 2 OF 2 WEB PC WORKSTATIONS COULD NOT BE LOCATED. JOTS-7 DID NOT INTERFACE WITH THE NETWORK. GENSER JOTS-19 VIDEO DISPLAY WAS DEGRADED. SI JOTS-19 WAS INOP. GENERIC FRONT END COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR WAS INOP. COMMAND AND CONTROL TO PC (C2PC) SERVER LOAD WAS INOP. OF THE SEVEN PC WORKSTATIONS LOCATED, THREE WERE VERIFIED TO HAVE C2PC SOFTWARE LOADED, BUT NONE HAD ACCESS TO TRACKPLOT DATA AND OVERLAYS. PASSIVE LINK TAP SERVING GCCS WAS INOP. FLEET BROADCAST INPUT, OTCIXS, TADIXS, AND AADS INTERFACES WERE INOP.

BH. VENTILATION AIRFLOW WAS DEGRADED IN SEVERAL SPACES THROUGHOUT THE SHIP BECAUSE CPS WAS NOT COMPLETELY INSTALLED AND FINAL SHIP-WIDE VENTILATION SYSTEM BALANCING WAS NOT COMPLETED.

BI. THE FOLLOWING SANITARY SPACES (HEADS) WERE NOT PRODUCTION COMPLETE (SHOWERS, COMMODOES, JOINER BULKHEADS) OR OUTFITTED IN THE FOLLOWING SPACES: 3-91-2-L, 3-90-4-L, 3-88-4-L, 3-88-2-L, 3-90-2-L, 2-103-4-L, AND 03-114-2-L.

BJ. 8 OF 8 HYDROGEN SULFIDE DETECTOR HEADS HAVE NEVER HAD PMS CONDUCTED. HYDROGEN SULFIDE CALIBRATION KIT WAS NOT ONBOARD.

BK. RECOMMEND SELF SUSPENSION OF ALL FLIGHT OPERATIONS UNTIL COMMUNICATION AND DECK STATUS SYSTEMS ARE REPAIRED AND TESTED SAT. KITE PHONE SYSTEM IN HELO CONTROL STATION LOST UHF COMMUNICATIONS WHEN FLIGHT DECK STATUS WAS CHANGED UTILIZING THE FLIGHT DECK STATUS SYSTEM PUSH BUTTONS. KITE PHONE HAD TO BE RESET TO PREVIOUSLY SELECTED UHF SETTINGS TO RESTORE COMMUNICATIONS. PREVIOUS FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED UTILIZING PROCEDURAL DEVIATIONS AND A SEPARATE BACKUP STAND ALONE PORTABLE UHF RADIO TO PREVENT LOST COMMUNICATIONS. SHIP REPORTS THIS SAFETY OF FLIGHT CONCERN HAS BEEN INTERMITTENT FOR OVER 6 MONTHS.

BL. JP5 SMALL BOAT AND VEHICLE FUELING STATIONS WERE UNABLE TO BE TESTED. STATIONS WERE UNABLE TO REDUCE 150-180 PSI AUXILIARY FUEL DOWN TO 3-7 PSI AT CLAVAL PRESSURE REDUCERS INSTALLED AT EACH STATION. STATIONS WERE UNSAFE TO OPERATE AND TAGGED OUT.

BM. MOGAS STORAGE SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE (STARRED ITEM).

BN. WIND INDICATING SYSTEM REQUIRED VALIDATION AND CERTIFICATION FOLLOWING WIND TUNNEL TESTS CONDUCTED TO IDENTIFY WIND SPEED AND DIRECTIONAL VARIATIONS FROM WIND ANEMOMETERS. CURRENT DETECTOR LOCATION DOES NOT PROVIDE OPTIMAL RELATIVE WIND DIRECTIONS AT ALL SPEEDS. ALTHOUGH FULL AVCERT HAS BEEN ISSUED, CURRENT CERT MAY BE AFFECTED PENDING RESULTS OF VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF TESTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION WILL BE CRITICAL AS CLASS HULLS CONTINUE TO BE

CONSTRUCTED WITH THIS CURRENT CONFIGURATION. LPD 17 IS CURRENTLY OPERATING UTILIZING THE UPWIND SENSOR FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND GENERIC WIND ENVELOPES.

BO. CURRENT AVCERT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE V-22 OR AV-8 OPERATIONS. V-22 AND AV-8 OPERATIONS ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTED ON AN INTERIM BASIS WITH LPD 17 CLASS SHIPS.

BP. BASELINE NOISE AND HEAT STRESS SURVEYS WERE NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE THE VENTILATION SYSTEMS WERE INCOMPLETE AND UNBALANCED.

BQ. VENTILATION FAN ROOMS AT THE SKIN OF THE SHIP WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO WATER INTRUSION FROM RAIN BECAUSE OF THE SLOPING FREEBOARD AND HULL LINES. LOUVERS WILL BE INSTALLED DURING PSA (REPLACE EXISTING SCREENS) TO KEEP WATER FROM ENTERING AND FLOODING FAN ROOMS (STARRED ITEM).

BR. SHIPS OVERALL SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS SAT. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY OF AUXILIARIES WAS EVALUATED AS UNSAT.

BS. 124 OF 269 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.

BT. 0 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL.

BU. 8 OF 18 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.

BV. 6 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.

BW. INSURV CARRIED OVER 1,231 ELECTRONIC TRIAL CARDS (ETC) FROM THE ACCEPTANCE TRIAL, TRANSFERRED 355 WORK ITEMS FROM THE SHIP CSMP, AND SCRIBED 3,868 NEW ETCS DURING THE TRIAL. TOTAL ETC COUNT FOR THE FCT: 5,454.

BX. A SUCCESSFUL INSPECTION MUST BE CONDUCTED AT SEA. SUCH A MATERIAL INSPECTION WILL INCLUDE AT A MINIMUM OPERATIONS AT FULL POWER AND BE OF SUFFICIENT THOROUGHNESS TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFECTS HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE AT. FUTURE INSPECTION CONSTRUCT WILL BE A TOTAL SHIP INSPECTION TO INCLUDE:

- ACHIEVE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT
- WATER PRODUCTION
- FULL POWER
- QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD/ASTERN
- STEERING AHEAD/ASTERN
- ANCHOR DROP
- BALLAST/DEBALLAST
- AFFF
- COUNTERMEASURE WASHDOWN
- MAIN DRAINAGE
- AMMO ROUTES
- SELF-DEFENSE DTE
- LINK CHECKS
- IFF CHECKS
- TACAN CHECKS

- SMALL BOAT FUELING
- VEHICLE RAMP DEMONSTRATION
- PORT SIDE PORT
- NIXIE
- EMI
- MRG DEHUMIDIFIER FLOW
- 1MC AND GENERAL ALARM CHECKS
- SWAN FALLOVER TESTING

3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE PRIOR TO FCT: (COUNT 39)

NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		CATEGORY
06002	COMM SYS-1MC		2
06008	SHIP CONTROL SYS		2
06038	UPS NR 63	2	
06044	RO NR 1	3	
06047	EDUCTOR AMR3		3
06048	EDUCTOR AMR1		3
06049	EDUCTOR MMR2		3
06050	EDUCTOR MMR1		3
06052	EDUCTOR AMR3		3
06053	EDUCTOR AMR1		3
06054	EDUCTOR AMR2		3
06064	SHAFT SEAL	3	
06065	SWAN IBUS SERVER		2
06073	SSDG NR 2 UPS 72		2
06078	SHAFT SEAL	2	
06080	FRESH WATER SYS		2
06085	RO UNIT NR 3	3	
07006	JP5 FUEL, XFR STAT		2
07007	STATIC FREQ CONV		3
07008	SWAN NTWK NR 3		2
07009	SSDG NR 3	2	
07011	ASW PUMP NR 1		2
07012	ASW PUMP NR	2	
07014	NR 3 LSB	2	
07015	A/C UNIT NR 1	2	
07016	BOAT DAVIT	2	
07017	PWR CONV SYS		2
07020	SW BALLAST TANK		2
07021	SWAN NTWK DLT 8000		2
07023	ASW VALVE	2	
07025	23TV	2	
07028	AN/SPS-48 RADAR		3
07029	SSDG NR 5	3	
07030	RO UNIT NR 2	3	
07031	MPAC UNIT	3	
07032	CONVERSION, POWER		3
07033	ALARM, SAFETY AND WARNING		3
07034	NR 2 LPAC	3	
07035	NR 1 MPAC	3	

4. THE FOLLOWING DEPARTURES FROM SPEC WERE ACTIVE UPON COMPLETION OF FCT: (TOTAL 34)

DFS REQUEST NR	DATE	DESCRIPTION
LPD17-01-06	31MAR06	WATER MIST SYSTEM
LPD17-03-06	23FEB07	STARBOARD SHAFT BULKHEAD SEAL
LPD17-05-06	23FEB07	STARBOARD SHAFT BULKHEAD SEAL
LPD17-06-06	23FEB07	HOLE IN FUEL VENT PIPING
LPD17-07-06	11DEC06	1 OF 5 EDUCTOR SUCTION ISOLATION
LPD17-08-06	11DEC06	3 OF 5 EDUCTOR DISCHARGE VALVES
LPD17-09-06	11DEC06	3 OF 5 EDUCTOR DISCHARGE VALVES
LPD17-10-06	11DEC06	3 OF 5 EDUCTOR DISCHARGE VALVES
LPD17-11-06	11DEC06	4 OF 5 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVES
LPD17-12-06	11DEC06	5 OF 5 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVES
LPD17-13-06	11DEC06	4 OF 5 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVES
LPD17-14-06	11DEC06	4 OF 5 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVES
LPD17-15-06	11DEC06	4 OF 5 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVES
LPD17-16-06	26FEB07	LO PRESSURE DROP MRG
LPD17-02-07	27FEB07	LO VENTING MRG
LPD17-03-07	23FEB07	60HZ SWBD SIGNALS
LPD17-06-07	23FEB07	400HZ CONVERTER
LPD17-07-07	23FEB07	400HZ SYSTEM/400HZ BUS TIE
LPD17-08-07	23FEB07	MPDE/MPDE SPEED SIGNALS
LPD17-09-07	23FEB07	MPDE/MPDE POSITION/LEVEL
LPD17-10-07	23FEB07	MRG/MRG SUMP LEVEL
LPD17-11-07	23FEB07	CPP/PP SUMP LEVEL
LPD17-12-07	26FEB07	SSDG/SSDG PRESSURE
LPD17-13-07	23FEB07	FUELING AT SEA SYSTEM
LPD17-14-07	23FEB07	RO PLANT TEM SIGNALS
LPD17-15-07	23FEB07	RO PLANT SALINITY SIGNALS
LPD17-16-07	23FEB07	OILY WASTE TRANSFER SYSTEM
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 1 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 2 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 3 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 4 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 5 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 6 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)
LPD17-25-07	27MAR07	NR 7 AC PLANT (REQUESTED)

5. THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS WERE ACTIVE UPON COMPLETION OF FCT: (TOTAL 28)

TSO NR	DESCRIPTION
001	HEARING PROTECTION
004	DESYNCHRONIZATION OF ECS
011	ECS/OOS
012	DBAC NR 2 OPERATION
014	BRIDGE CRANE TELESCOPING BEAM
015	NR 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 5 MN DRAIN EDUCATORS (5 TSO)
016	SS 56 HIGH SPEED OPERATION
017	FIREMAIN LEAKAGE
018	FIREMAIN SUPPLY VALVE LEAKAGE
019	BULKHEAD SHAFT SEAL
020	BULKHEAD SHAFT SEAL
024	PRESSURE ON NR 5 EDUCTOR
026	MRG LO PUMPS
027	NR 1, NR 2, AND NR 3 SFCS
028	NR 2 HANGER BAY SPRINKLER
029	NR 3 EDUCTOR

- 030 NR 1 EDUCTOR
- 031 NR 1 MRG
- 032 NR 2 MAIN DRAINING EDUCTOR OPERATION
- 033 REEFER SPACES
- 034 NR 2 AND NR 3 RO UNITS
- 035 NR 4 MAIN DRAINAGE EDUCTOR
- 036 DEWATERING OF SHAFT ALLEY NR 1
- 037 NR 3 FIRE PUMP
- 038 NR 2 LPAC
- 039 PORT AND STBD STEERING FAN COOLER
- 040 NR 2 MPAC
- 042 NR 2, 3, 7, 9, AND 10 FIRE PUMPS (5 TSO)
- 043 NR 6 AC

6. INSPECTION OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS/SYSTEMS/EQUIPMENTS WERE NOT COMPLETED:

- PORT SIDE PORT DOOR CHECKS
- NR 3 WEAPONS ELEVATOR CHECKS
- STARBOARD RUDDER POST INFLATABLE SEAL TEST
- NRS 1, 5, 6, AND 7 AC PLANT CHECKS
- NRS 1 AND 5 FIRE PUMPS CHECKS
- NR 6 ASW PUMP CHECKS
- NRS 1, 2, AND 3 RO UNITS CHECKS
- AN/KSQ-1 (OR AADS) INCOMPLETE INSTALL
- SSES/INCREMENT-E INCOMPLETE INSTALL

7. THE FOLLOWING SINGLE STARRED DEFICIENCIES WERE REPORTED CORRECTED BUT WERE FOUND TO STILL EXIST: (18 TOTAL)

CARD	SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT	STATUS
LPD17TC	1G3001AX01 CARGO/WPN ELEVATOR	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3002AX01 CHLORINATOR/DECHLORINATOR	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3005AX01 STEERING SYSTEM	WAIVED (RW-0206)
LPD17TC	1G3006AX01 RUDDERS	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3007AX01 REFRIGERANT MONITORS	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3003WP01 AMMO HANDLING ROUTES	NOT DEMONSTRATED
LPD17TC	1G3001WP02 MK46 AMMO RSLs	NOT INSTALLED
LPD17TC	1G3005WP01 NIXIE DEMO	NOT DEMONSTRATED
LPD17TC	1G3001WP03 MK46/MK44 GWS ILS	NOT INSTALLED
LPD17TC	1G3002IS01 SSES INCREMENT-E	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3005IS01 ECS CONSOLES	DEGRADED
LPD17TC	1G3001IS01 GCCS-M	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3001CC01 KSQ-1	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G3002DC01 MCTS	NOT WATERTIGHT
LPD17TC	1K3009DC01 DECON STATIONS	INCOMPLETE
LPD17TC	1G0001OP01 AEM SYSTEM	UNSAFE LADDER
LPD17TC	KITE COMM/VLA	UNSAT DEMO
LPD17TC	JP5 REFUEL SYSTEM	INCOMPLETE

8. THE FOLLOWING OPEN SINGLE STARRED DEFICIENCIES WERE CNO WAIVED FOR SHIP DELIVERY AND ARE SCHEDULED FOR PSA COMPLETION: (12 TOTAL)

- MOGAS
- PORT RUDDER POST
- EMI TESTING

- SMOKE EJECTION SYSTEM (2 CARDS)
- CPS VENTILATION (NON MACHINERY SPACES)
- FIREMAIN AND FLUSHING SYSTEM
- DEGAUSSING
- DOPPLER SONAR VELOCITY LOG
- BASELINE HEAT STRESS AND NOISE SURVEY
- SSDS MK2 MOD2
- VENTILATION LOUVERS

9. THE FOLLOWING STARRED DEFICIENCIES WERE INCOMPLETE:

CARD	SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT	STATUS
LPD17TC 2G00224OP01	NULKA/SRBOC LIGHTS	NOT INSTALLED
LPD17TC	FWD VEHICLE RAMP	
LPD17TC	AFT VEHICLE RAMP	
LPD17TC 2G6392DK01	HEAVY WEATHER LIFELINES	
LPD17TC	WELL DECK VENTILATION	
LPD17TC 2G6233DK01	ACCOMMODATION LADDER PORT	
LPD17TC 2G6233DK03	ACCOMMODATION LADDER PORT	
LPD17TC 2G6233DK06	ACCOMMODATION LADDER PORT	
LPD17TC 2G6233DK09	ACCOMMODATION LADDER PORT	
LPD17TC 2G6233DK10	ACCOMMODATION LADDER PORT	

10. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE:

B. PROPULSION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.54):

- 4 OF 4 MPDE BLOW-IN DOORS FAILED TO OPERATE IAW PMS (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 5 SSDG BLOW-IN DOORS FAILED TO OPERATE IAW PMS (CORRECTED).
- 4 OF 4 MPDE COMBINED AIR INTAKE HIGH VACUUM PRESSURE ALARMS WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 4 MPDE OVERSPEED TRIPS FAILED TO MECHANICALLY TRIP WITHIN DESIGN RANGE (582-592 RPM) (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 4 MPDE JACKET WATER HEATERS WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 4 MPDE CLUTCH AIR PRESSURE LOW ALARMS WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 4 MPDE EMERGENCY STOP (FLAPPER) VALVE WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 4 MPDE ELECTRIC LUBE OIL PUMP WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 4 MPDE FUEL FILTER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE HIGH ALARMS ILLUMINATED ON ECS CONSOLES BELOW THE ALARM SET POINT (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 2 MRG VENT FOG PRECIPITATOR RUN INDICATORS WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 2 MRG SIGHT FLOW INDICATORS DID NOT HAVE PHYSICAL SECURITY DEVICES.
- 1 OF 2 MRG HUMIDITY INDICATIONS WAS ABOVE THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE LIMIT.
- 2 OF 12 LINE SHAFT BEARING LUBE OIL SUMP LEVELS WERE OVER-FILLED (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 12 LINE SHAFT BEARING LUBE OIL SUMP LEVELS WERE LOW (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 12 LINE SHAFT BEARINGS HAD LUBE OIL POOLED ON THE FOUNDATIONS (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 2 MPDE LUBE OIL PURIFIER SUPPLY PUMPS LEAKED LUBE OIL (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 2 MRG LUBE OIL FILTER/STRAINER COVER LOCKS WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 2 FUEL OIL PURIFIERS HAD FUEL OIL POOLED AT THE FOUNDATION

(CORRECTED).

- 1 OF 4 FUEL OIL QUICK CLOSING VALVES WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
- 5 OF 18 REMOTE OPERATED FUEL OIL VALVES FAILED TO OPERATE FROM REMOTE OR SHUT FULLY FROM REMOTE.
- 1 OF 5 SSDGS WAS INOP.
- 1 OF 5 SSDG PRIMARY HFP FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 5 SSDG JACKET WATER EXPANSION TANK LEVELS WAS LOW (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 5 SSDG LUBE OIL SUMP LEVELS WAS LOW (CORRECTED).
- 1 OF 5 SSDG INTAKE AIR FILTERS WAS DIRTY.

C. AUXILIARIES: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.52):

- PORT ANCHOR WINDLASS HPU SERVO PRESSURE MISADJUSTED AND CYCLES (500 VICE 600 PSIG) (CORRECTED).
- STBD ANCHOR WINDLASS HPU SERVO PRESSURE MISADJUSTED (440 VICE 600 PSIG) (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 2 ANCHOR WINDLASS REDUCTION GEAR HYDRAULIC PUMPS LEAKED AT UPPER FLANGE GASKET (CORRECTED).
- STBD ANCHOR WINDLASS BRAKE MECHANISM SUPPORT BRACKET (INBD FWD) WAS LOOSE (CORRECTED).
- PORT AND STBD ANCHOR WINDLASS BRAKE SHAFT STANDS LACKED LUBRICATION (CORRECTED).
- PORT AND STBD ANCHOR WINDLASS BRAKE LINKAGES LACKED LUBRICATION (CORRECTED).
- STBD STEERING HPU SERVO PRESSURE WAS MISADJUSTED (825 VICE 680 PLUS-OR-MINUS 25 PSI) (CORRECTED).
- PORT STEERING HPU CONTROLLER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH STARTED THE HPU WHEN PLACED IN THE TEST POSITION (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 2 STEERING HPU ACCUMULATORS WERE OVERCHARGED (110 VICE 100 PLUS-OR-MINUS 5 PSIG) (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 2 STEERING HPU HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAN OIL COOLERS WOULD NOT OPERATE IN AUTOMATIC.
- 2 OF 2 PORT STEERING HPU OIL FILTER DIRTY FILTER INDICATORS INDICATED DIRTY (CORRECTED).
- 2 OF 2 STARBOARD STEERING HPU OIL FILTER DIRTY FILTER INDICATORS INDICATED DIRTY (CORRECTED).
- 5 OF 7 AC UNITS HAD RUPTURED ACCUMULATOR BLADDERS.
- 3 OF 7 AC UNITS HAD LOW REFRIGERANT CHARGE. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT REFRIGERANT ONBOARD TO RECHARGE THE UNITS.
- 2 OF 7 AC UNITS LEAKED REFRIGERANT.
- 2 OF 7 AC UNITS HAD CLOGGED CONDENSER WATER PRESSURE FAILURE SENSOR GAGE LINES.
- 2 OF 3 HALOCARBON MONITORS WERE IMPROPERLY INSTALLED (SINGLE POINT MONITORING) AND 1 OF 3 HAD RUSTY AND MISSING HARDWARE.
- NR 2 AC UNIT HOT GAS BYPASS VALVE WAS INOP.
- NR 1 AC UNIT OIL PUMP AND SUCTION ELBOW WAS REMOVED (CASREP 07015).
- NR 5 AC UNIT OIL PUMP WAS INOP BECAUSE OF SEAL LEAK.
- NR 6 AC UNIT CONDENSER WATER CONTROL VALVE WOULD NOT OPERATE IN AUTO.
- NR 4 CHILL WATER FLOW WAS NEAR LOW END SHUTDOWN.
- NR 7 CHILL WATER PUMP MECHANICAL SEAL LEAKED EXCESSIVELY.
- ALL CHILL WATER SYSTEM ALARMS (TEMP, PRESSURE, FLOW) INDICATED FAULT IN ECS.
- AC UNIT REFRIGERANT STOWAGE RACKS DID NOT HOLD ENOUGH BOTTLES TO REPLACE ONE FULL CHARGE (700 LBS).
- AC UNIT COMPARTMENTS DID NOT HAVE OIL TANK STORAGE RACKS INSTALLED.
- NR 1 REFRIGERATION UNIT WAS INOP BECAUSE COMPRESSOR SUCTION LINE

FILTER WAS RESTRICTED, LOW PRESSURE SWITCH WAS MISADJUSTED, AND 3 VALVES LEAKED OIL.

-FREEZE BOX DOOR WAS WARPED CAUSING AIR LEAKAGE.

-3 OF 3 LPACS FAILED TO AUTO START (CASREPS 07034, 07035).

-NR 1 LPAC SEA WATER OVERBOARD HIGH TEMP SAFETY RTD WAS FAULTY.

-NR 2 LPAC DISCHARGE PRESSURE WAS 120 PSIG VICE 50 PSIG WHILE UNLOADED.

-NR 3 LPAC DISCHARGE PRESSURE WAS 70 PSIG VICE 50 PSIG WHILE UNLOADED.

-1 OF 2 MPAC FAILED TO AUTO START (CASREP 07031).

-NR 2 MPAC SECOND STAGE DISCHARGE PRESSURE GAGE WAS NOT INSTALLED.

-2 OF 10 FIRE PUMPS WERE INOP (NR 1 AND NR 5).

-5 OF 8 FIRE PUMPS INSPECTED HAD INCORRECT DISCHARGE VALVE POSITIONS INDICATED ON ECS.

-NR 6 FIRE PUMP MOTOR CONTROLLER WAS MIS-WIRED, WHICH INTERMITTENTLY RESULTED IN BREAKERS ON BOTH NORMAL AND EMERGENCY LOAD CENTERS TRIPPING WHEN PUMP WAS STARTED.

-2 OF 8 FIRE PUMPS INSPECTED HAD INCORRECT STATUS INDICATIONS ON ECS AND COULD BE STARTED REMOTELY WHEN MOTOR CONTROLLER SWITCHES WERE IN LOCAL POSITION.

-NR 3 FIRE PUMP COULD NOT BE STARTED FROM CCS.

-NR 6 ASW PUMP WAS REPORTED INOP (CASREP 07012).

-NR 1 ASW PUMP MECHANICAL SEAL LEAKED APPROXIMATELY 150 DROPS PER MINUTE (CASREP 07011).

-3 OF 3 RO UNITS HIGH PRESSURE PUMP OIL DRAIN PLUG WAS INACCESSIBLE FOR PMS OIL CHANGEOUT. OIL WILL DRAIN INTO WATER TROUGH BELOW.

-NR 3 RO UNIT BRINE LIMIT TORQUE VALVE WAS MOUNTED WITH A WOODEN SHIM AND COPPER WIRE.

-NR 3 RO UNIT HEATER ELEMENT CANISTER WAS CHARRED, INDICATING OVER HEATING OF HEATER ELEMENTS.

-2 OF 3 RO UNITS DRIVE BELTS WERE OUT OF ADJUSTMENT.

-2 OF 3 RO UNITS SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES WERE OUT OF PERIODICITY.

-NR 1 RO UNIT LOW PRESSURE FEED PUMP AUTO VENT SYSTEM FLEX HOSE WAS REMOVED AND VENT LINE PLUGGED.

-NR 3 RO UNIT HIGH PRESSURE PUMP DESURGER MOUNTING FASTENERS WERE MISSING.

-2 OF 4 POTABLE WATER PUMP PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS WERE OUT OF CALIBRATION.

-4 OF 4 POTABLE WATER PUMP LOW PRESSURE AUTOMATIC START FEATURES WERE NOT INSTALLED.

-2 OF 14 POTABLE WATER HEATER TEMP REGULATORS WERE OUT-OF-SPEC HIGH.

-6 OF 14 POTABLE WATER HEATERS HAD MINOR CORROSION OR RUNNING RUST ON FOUNDATIONS.

-5 OF 14 POTABLE WATER HEATERS HAD MINOR WATER LEAKS.

-9 HOT POTABLE WATER TEMP SWITCHES WERE PAST DUE FOR CALIBRATION OR MISSING CALIBRATION STICKERS.

-NR 1 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR TERMINAL LEVEL UP HIGH SPEED STOP SWITCH WAS MOUNTED INCORRECTLY (ISL).

-NR 1 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC CYLINDER ROD STRUCK MAIN DECK DOOR GUARD ROLLER ARMS AT 1ST PLATFORM, 3RD DECK.

-NR 1 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR PLATFORM HOIST WIRE ROPES WERE NOT LUBRICATED AND LOWER SECTION AT PLATFORM QUARTER SHEAVES WERE CORRODED.

-NR 1 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR DOGGED PROXIMITY SWITCH CABLES FOR 4TH DECK AND INNER-BOTTOM DOORS WERE DAMAGED.

-NR 1 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR TRUNK WARNING STATEMENTS, KEEP OFF

ELEVATOR WHEN IN OPERATION, AND SAFE WORKING LOAD 12000 LBS WAS NOT POSTED.

-2 OF 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATORS HAD INOP MAIN DECK DOORS AND NR 1 HAD INOP 2ND PLATFORM DOOR.

-2 OF 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATORS WERE MISSING WEIGHT TEST DATA.

-NR 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC PUMP FLUID SUMP OIL LEVEL WAS LOW.

-NR 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR HAD HYDRAULIC, GREASE, AND OIL SEAL LEAKS.

-NR 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR HOIST WIRE ROPE SHEAVE WIRE ROPE RETAINER BAR WAS MISALIGNED AND ALLOWED WIRE ROPE TO FALL FROM SHEAVE DURING SLACK ROPE TEST.

-NR 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR MAIN DECK DOOR AFT DOG CYLINDER LINKAGE WAS DAMAGED AND NOT CONNECTED TO FOUNDATION.

-NR 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR HOIST WIRE ROPE BITTER ENDS WERE NOT SWEDGED.

-NR 2 CARGO/WEAPONS ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC PRESSURE GAGES WERE NOT CALIBRATED.

-NR 1 DUMBWAITER BRAKE DID NOT RELEASE (ISL).

-NR 2 DUMBWAITER BRAKE DID NOT FULLY RELEASE (ISL).

-NR 1 AND 2 DUMBWAITER DISCONNECT SWITCHES HAD EXPOSED WIRES IN BREAKER BOX.

-3 OF 3 DBAC LUBE OIL SYSTEMS WERE MISSING FLANGE SHIELDS (CORRECTED).

-3 OF 3 DBACS HAD LUBE OIL PRESSURE SWITCHES OVERDUE FOR CALIBRATION (CORRECTED).

-NR 1 DBAC DISCHARGE PRESSURE GAGE AND HIGH PRESSURE SWITCH LINE LEAKED AIR FROM A MECHANICAL COMPRESSION FITTING LOCATED BELOW THE PRESSURE GAGE (CORRECTED).

-NR 1 DBAC AIR DISCHARGE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER HAD A REJECTED CALIBRATION STICKER.

-NR 1 DBAC INDICATED 34 PSIG AT DEBALLAST CONTROL STATION WHEN ACTUAL PRESSURE WAS 0 PSIG.

-2 OF 2 BALLAST HPUS HAD HYDRAULIC LEAKS.

-2 OF 2 BALLAST HPUS HAD PRESSURE GAGES AND TRANSDUCERS THAT WERE REJECTED, OVERDUE AND MISSING CALIBRATION.

-2 OF 2 BALLAST HPUS HAD OUT-OF-SPEC ACCUMULATOR PRESSURES.

-2 OF 2 BALLAST HPUS WERE MISSING TEST DATA FOR PUMP, MAIN VALVE BLOCK, AND ACCUMULATOR RELIEF VALVES.

-2 OF 2 BALLAST HPU HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR RADAR LEVEL DETECTORS WERE MISSING CALIBRATION DATA (CRL01869 AND CRL03019).

-NR 2 BALLAST HPU RING SUPPLY VALVE BALH2-4 LEAKED SIGNIFICANTLY AND OIL WAS POOLED ON DECK BELOW.

-NR 2 BALLAST HPU FWD ACCUMULATOR LEAKED AT BOTTOM VALVE LINE CONNECTIONS.

-NR 2 BALLAST HPU AFT ACCUMULATOR LEAKED SIGNIFICANTLY AT BOTTOM FLANGE BLOCK AND OIL WAS POOLED UNDER THE ACCUMULATOR.

-NR 2 BALLAST HPU ACCUMULATORS PRESSURE BUILT UP DURING HYDRAULIC PUMP OPERATION AND EQUALIZED PUMP PRESSURE INDICATING POSSIBLE RUPTURED BLADDERS OR LEAKING BY OF THE RELIEF, FILL OR DUMP VALVE.

-UPPER AND LOWER STERN GATE FULLY CLOSED PROXIMITY SWITCHES WERE LOOSE (CORRECTED).

-UPPER STERN GATE WAS INOP BECAUSE CONTROLLER PANEL WAS NOT RECEIVING A FULLY CLOSED SIGNAL INDICATION.

-UPPER STERN GATE PORT HYDRAULIC RAM ROD END HAD A SIGNIFICANT HYDRAULIC OIL LEAK.

- LOWER STERN GATE PORT HYDRAULIC RAM ROD END LEAKED HYDRAULIC OIL.
- LOWER STERN GATE FULLY CLOSED PROXIMITY SWITCHES WERE MECHANICALLY CHEATED TO OPERATE SYSTEM (CORRECTED).
- LOWER STERN GATE STBD HYDRAULIC RAM LEAKED OIL.
- LOWER STERN GATE HORIZONTAL AND FULLY CLOSED INDICATOR LIGHTS WERE INOP.
- REFRIGERATION PLANT PMS LOADOUT DID NOT REFLECT SHIPS ACTUAL CONFIGURATION.
- INSTALLED HALOCARBON DETECTION SYSTEMS HAD NO PMS, NO ILS SUPPORT, NO TEST REPORT, WAS NOT LISTED IN THE SHOCK DATABASE, WAS NOT EMI CERTIFIED, AND HAD NO CALIBRATION SUPPORT.
- STEERING GEAR PMS LOAD OUT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH INSTALLED EQUIPMENT. SHIPS FORCE ATTEMPTED TO UPDATE AND CORRECT PMS, BUT ERRORS WERE EITHER INTRODUCED OR RE-INJECTED INTO LOAD OUT DATED JANUARY 2007.
- NRS 1 AND 2 MPAC MEMBRANE DEHYDRATORS HAD NO PMS FOR CHECKING DEWPOINT.
- LPAC PMS LOAD OUT DID NOT REFLECT SHIPS ACTUAL CONFIGURATION.
- DEBALLAST AIR COMPRESSORS AND HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT PMS AND EOSS LOAD OUT DID NOT SUPPORT SHIPS ACTUAL CONFIGURATION. EOSS/BOSS REQUIRES REVIEW.
- DUMBWAITER PMS DID NOT APPLY TO INSTALLED EQUIPMENT.
- ANCHOR WINDLASS PMS DOCUMENTATION HAD ERRORS WRT LUBRICATION (TYPE, LOCATION, AND PERIODICITY).
- WATER HEATER PMS LOAD OUT WAS FOR STEAM WATER HEATERS, BUT SHIP HAD ELECTRIC WATER HEATERS.
- AC PLANT CHLORINATORS WERE LACKING ILS AND EOSS WAS PARTIALLY COMPLETE.
- LOWER STERN GATE PORT SIDE LOCAL CONTROL PANEL DID NOT HAVE A WIRING SCHEMATIC POSTED INSIDE CONTROLLER.

D. ELECTRICAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67):

- THERE WERE 2 4-STAR AND 1 3-STAR THERMAL DISCREPANCIES (CORRECTED).
- NR 5 SSDG WAS OOC AND WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE OF CONTROL SYSTEM FAULTS THAT INITIATED UNCOMMANDED OPENING OF GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER (CASREP 007029).
- SHIPWIDE CABLEWAY INSTALLATION DISCREPANCIES REMAIN. DOD-STD-2003 ELECTRICAL PLANT INSTALLATION STANDARDS METHODS WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH SHIPWIDE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVSEAINST 9304.1C, A FINAL CABLEWAY INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED TO BE CONDUCTED. ALL CATEGORY I, II, AND III DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THIS INSPECTION SHALL BE RECORDED AND TRACKED TO ENSURE CORRECTIVE ACTION IS PERFORMED.
- NR 2 LOCOP WAS GROUNDED (CORRECTED).
- ICCP SYSTEM WAS DE-ENERGIZED FROM 10 OCT 06 UNTIL 2 NOV 06 WITH NO EXPLANATION AND/OR DOCUMENTATION OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE OR TESTING.
- EXPOSED WIRING WAS NOTED IN THE FWD AND AFT 1MC RACKS.
- 5MC AND 6MC WAS INOP.
- 5 POWER PANELS WERE GROUNDED (2 CORRECTED).
- OPERATOR WAS UNABLE TO REMOTELY MONITOR AND CONTROL NR 1, NR 2, AND NR 3 SFFCS (DFS LPD17-18-07).
- WHEN AFT DEBARK 1MC MICROPHONE WAS KEYED THE GENERAL ALARM SOUNDED. AFT 1MC SYSTEM HAD TO BE SHUTDOWN TO RESET STATION.
- 2 POWER PANELS WERE MISSING BREAKER MODULES AND BLANKS WERE NOT INSTALLED LEAVING EXPOSED ENERGIZED BUSWORK.
- VAPOR CORROSION INHIBITORS WERE NOT INSTALLED IN CONTROLLERS LOCATED IN HIGH HUMIDITY AREAS.

-ACTIVE SHAFT GROUNDING RIGS AND BRUSHES HAVE COME IN CONTACT WITH AND DAMAGED SENSING BAND BUCKLES AND SECURING HARDWARE ON BOTH SHAFTS.

-3 ABTS FAILED TO SHIFT IAW PMS.

E. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.71):

-CBR DEFENSE AND SURVIVABILITY WAS UNSAT. SHIP LACKED INSTALLED CHEMICAL AND PORTABLE BIOLOGICAL AGENT DETECTION CAPABILITY.

-2 OF 2 IPDS (ER04) WERE INOP

-2 OF 2 AN/KAS-1 UNITS WERE INOP

-3 OF 3 DFUS WERE NOT ELECTRICALLY SAFETY CHECKED AND ALL HHAS WERE EXPIRED.

-3 OF 3 CPS DECON STATIONS AND 1 OF 1 CCA DECON STATIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES.

-3 OF 4 DECON STATIONS LACKED STORAGE FOR REQUIRED EQUIPMENT.

-NO HTH WAS ONBOARD FOR DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES.

-4 OF 4 DECON STATION SHOWERS COULD NOT BE OPERATED WITH SALTWATER AND THE ATTENDANTS STATIONS WERE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE CPS ZONE.

-2 OF 8 CMWD ZONES WERE INOP BECAUSE ZONE 2 (ER04) HAD A FAULTY ISOLATION VALVE AND ZONE 6 HAD SIGNIFICANT PIPING LEAKS.

-SCBA CHARGING CAPABILITY WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED. 1 OF 2 BREATHING AIR COMPRESSORS AND 2 OF 3 EBACS WERE INOP.

-SCBA CHARGING STATION NR 5 INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE. 6 OF 6 INSTALLED CHARGING STATIONS HAD NO OPERATING PROCEDURES AVAILABLE OR POSTED. CHARGING STATIONS WERE INSTALLED WITH APPROXIMATELY 11 MECHANICAL PIPE JOINTS AT THE CHARGING STATION UTILIZING A HOST OF FITTINGS, VALVES, REDUCERS, GAGES, ETC. THIS INADEQUATE AND POTENTIALLY UNSAFE CONFIGURATION WAS CONNECTED TO A P-1, BREATHING AIR CLEAN AND PIPING SYSTEM. THE ONE AREA OF THE SYSTEM WHERE PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO WORK IN CLOSE PROXIMITY IS THE AREA THAT AFFORDS THE LEAST AMOUNT OF CONTROLS AND CONTAINS THE GREATEST DANGER OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE.

-SMOKE EJECTION SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS NOT COMPLETED (STARRED ITEM).

-MER-1 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVE LEAKED BY AND AMR 3 FIREMAIN ACTUATION VALVE PACKING LEAKED AND THE VALVE LEAKED BY (CASREP 06052) (DFS) (TSO).

-MD-V-35 FOR LOWER VEHICLE STOWAGE AREA (VSA) AFT AND MD-V-89 FOR CARGO AMMO MAG NR 3 WERE INOP REMOTELY.

-CHAIN LOCKER AND REEFER DRAIN TANK EDUCTOR SUCTION GAGES HAD NO VACUUM INDICATION.

-MOGAS READY SERVICE STATION OVERBOARD (OVBD) DISCHARGE VALVE WAS FROZEN SHUT.

-AFTER STEERING RAM ROOM, PORT AFT WELL DECK, AND STBD AFT WELL DECK SUCTION CHECK VALVES LEAKED BY.

-PORT FWD WELL DECK EDUCTOR OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE LEAKED BY.

-MOGAS PUMP ROOM EDUCTOR INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE (STARRED ITEM).

-NR2 SSDG OVHD AFFF SPRINKLING COV WAS INOP (CORRECTED).

-AMR-3 U/L AND L/L HOSE REELS WERE BINDING AND INOP (CORRECTED).

-MOGAS READY SERVICE ROOM OVHD AFFF SPRINKLING FAILED TO ACTIVATE.

-3 OF 17 VSA AFFF HOSE REELS WERE INOP BECAUSE OF THE REELS BINDING.

-15 OF 28 WELL DECK, VSA AND FLIGHT DECK AFFF HOSE REELS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED BECAUSE OF 11 INCORRECT, INOP OR LEAKING NOZZLES, AND 4 LEAKING HOSE REEL YOKE ASSEMBLIES.

-NR 3 SSDG HFP BOTTLE, E-147, CO2 ACTUATION TUBING FITTING WAS

STRIPPED AND LEAKING.

- NR2 SSDG VENT FANS FAILED TO SECURE UPON PRIMARY HFP ACTIVATION (CORRECTED).
- READY ISSUE ROOM HFP SYSTEM DID NOT HAVE CHECK VALVES INSTALLED IN THE CO2 ACTUATION PIPING (ER04).
- SD STOREROOM FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS PRIMARY TIME DELAY FAILED TO ACTIVATE IAW PMS.
- 3 OF 64 SCBAS WERE INOP BECAUSE ONE HAD LOW PRESSURE AND 2 FAILED THE LEAK TEST (1 CORRECTED).
- DC ORGANIZATION WAS NOT OUTFITTED AT CONSTRUCTION WITH A BREATHING AIR REDUCING SYSTEM (BARS) (ER04) AND A DIESEL GENERATOR.
- REPAIR LOCKERS HAD A SHORTAGE OF 16 FIREFIGHTER ENSEMBLES.
- DAMAGE CONTROL BOOK, DAMAGE CONTROL PLATES, EOSS DIAGRAMS, AND OTHER TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS CONTAINED NUMEROUS DISCREPANCIES. VALVE AND FITTING NUMBERING, IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION ARE NOT CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT THE DOCUMENTS.
- BREATHING AIR COMPRESSOR AUTO START/STOP PARAMETER IS DIFFERENT IN 3 SEPARATE TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS.

F. DECK: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73):

- KNUCKLE BOOM CRANE WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
- RESCUE BOAT DAVIT (CALEY DAVIT) TOW BOOM WAS INOP.
- WELL DECK OVERHEAD PAINT SYSTEM HAD FAILED.
- PORT SIDEPORT DOOR WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED.
- 2 OF 2 PORT SIDEPORT STBD INTER DOOR LIMIT SWITCHES WERE OUT OF ADJUSTMENT.
- MISSION BOAT INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE.
- 2 OF 2 ACCOM PLATFORM LADDERS WERE BROKEN.
- LIGHTING FOR PORT AND STBD ACCOM LADDERS WAS NOT INSTALLED.
- 10 OF 16 REVERSIBLE DECK BOLTS DID NOT FIT FLUSH IN SOCKET.
- 3 OF 3 RHIBS WERE MISSING SECURING GRIPES.
- 3 OF 3 RIBS WERE MISSING LIFTING SLINGS.
- 6 OF 6 FUEL RISER HOSES WERE MISSING HYDRO DATES (CORRECTED).
- FAS STATION 1 COULD NOT BE RETRACTED.
- RIB 11MRX002 WAS MISSING GPS ANTENNA, SECURITY LIGHT, AND NAVIGATION LIGHTS WERE INOP, HORN WAS INOP, FWD AND AFT ELECTRIC BILGE PUMPS WERE INOP, AND THE COMPASS LIGHT WAS INOP.
- TOW BOOM FOR CALEY DAVIT (RESCUE DAVIT) WAS INOP.
- 9 OF 14 SUPPLY VENTILATION FANS FOR WELL DECK WERE OOC.
- 14 OF 20 EXHAUST VENTILATION FANS FOR WELL DECK WERE OOC.
- 2 OF 3 VEHICLE RAMPS WERE INOP.
- PORT ACCOMMODATION LADDER WAS INOP.

G. OPERATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67):

- SPS-48 NITROGEN BOTTLE WAS NOT INSTALLED AS EMERGENCY SOURCE FOR WAVEGUIDE PRESSURIZATION.
- SATCOM COOLING WATER CONDUCTIVITY WAS OUT-OF-SPEC HIGH.
- CIC WAS NOT SECURED FOR SEA BECAUSE SIPR WORKSTATIONS, MONITORS, AND CMS SAFE WERE NOT ADEQUATELY SECURED.
- AFT MAST PORTABLE ACCESS LADDER WAS UNSAFE TO RIG ON MAST BECAUSE 3 OF 3 SECTIONS COULD NOT BE ADEQUATELY SECURED TO MAST.
- FWD MAST IFF ANTENNA MAINTENANCE PLATFORM WAS NOT SAFELY ACCESSIBLE.
- 2 OF 36 SRBOC LAUNCHER TUBES FAILED TO INDICATE LOADED.
- 1 OF 36 SRBOC LAUNCHER TUBES FAILED TO INDICATE FIRED.

H. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE: 0.92):

- PORT AND STBD BRIDGE WING .50 CAL GUN MOUNT PEDESTALS DID NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORT WEIGHT OF TWIN .50 CAL GUNS AND PERMITTED EXCESSIVE MOVEMENT.
- FWD RAM MISSILE HANDLING J-BAR DAVIT HAD IMPROPER FIT INTO DECK SOCKET. WHEN LOADED, DAVIT LEANED FORWARD AGAINST BULWARK PERMITTING SOLID CONTACT WITH BULWARK PREVENTING OUTBOARD/AFT SWING OF SUSPENDED LOAD TO LOWER MISSILE ON DECK.
- J-BAR DAVIT DID NOT HAVE WEIGHT TEST DATA TAG OR LABEL AFFIXED.
- BOTH FWD AND AFT MK31 RAM SALVO WARNING SIRENS WERE INCORRECT TYPE AND COULD NOT BE HEARD OVER AUDIBLE TRAIN WARNING BELLS.
- ESCAPE SCUTTLE (03-129-1) NEAR AFT RAM LAUNCHER DID NOT HAVE RED SALVO WARNING LIGHT INSTALLED TO WARN PERSONNEL OF IMPENDING MISSILE LAUNCH.
- FWD AND AFT MK31 RAM BARBETTES HAD EXTREME MOLD AND MILDEW GROWTH, CORROSION ON DECK EDGES AND WELD BEADS, AND EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF CONDENSATION DRIPPING/POOLED ON DECK.
- FWD MK31 RAM BARBETTE HAD AN INCOMPLETE FRESHWATER PIPE INSTALLATION THAT WAS DEAD-ENDED AND SIX INCHES ABOVE THE DECK. ISOLATION VALVE LEAKED BY AND PIPE OVERFLOWED WATER ON DECK IN SPACE.
- AFT MK31 RAM LOADING EQUIPMENT SET WAS MISSING D-RING ASSEMBLY FOR LOADING MISSILES INTO LAUNCHER.
- SALVO WARNING SWITCH LOCATED IN CIC NEXT TO MK31 RAM CONTROL PANELS WAS INCORRECTLY LABELED AS FLIGHT CRASH.
- 1 OF 4 TOXIC GAS VENT DAMPERS (01-38-2) WAS INOP BECAUSE OF AIR VALVE LEAK.
- AFT MK31 RAM BARBETTE RUBBER BOOT HAD SEAL FAILURE IN 3 SEPARATE LOCATIONS ALONG AFT EDGE OF BARBETTE (LIGHT OBSERVED FROM INSIDE BARBETTE).
- FWD MK46 30MM GUN MOUNT TRAIN WARNING BELL WAS INOP.
- BOTH FWD AND AFT MK46 30MM GUN MOUNTS LEAKED RAINWATER INTO MOUNT TURRET FROM GUN ROTOR SEALS AND FROM AZIMUTH RACE RING/AZIMUTH BEARING SEAL.
- BOTH FWD AND AFT AMMUNITION HANDLING J-BAR DAVITS FOR 30MM AMMUNITION WERE REDESIGNED AND REMANUFACTURED POST SAIL-AWAY. NEW DAVITS ARE UNUSABLE BECAUSE DAVIT HEIGHT IS TOO SHORT TO PERMIT LOAD TO BE LIFTED OFF OF DECK AND OVER PERMANENT BULWARK STRUCTURE.
- MK46 30MM GUN MOUNT OPERATION IS RESTRICTED TO REMOTE OPERATION FROM CIC. GUN TURRET CAN NOT BE MANNED DURING LIVE FIRE EVENTS OR CASUALTY RESPONSE BECAUSE OF ELEVATED TOXIC GAS LEVELS INSIDE TURRET.
- BOTH FWD AND AFT MK46 30MM TURRET ELEVATED PLATFORM DECK GRATING CREATES SAFETY HAZARD DURING AMMUNITION HANDLING EVOLUTIONS. ROUGH/SHARP SURFACE DESIGN OF GRATING CAN PUNCTURE BRASS CASING OR STRIKE ROUND PRIMERS CAUSING ROUND DETONATION IF LOOSE ROUNDS FALL ONTO GRATING.
- 35 OF 35 AT/FP TACVESTS DID NOT HAVE ANNUAL FLOAT TEST COMPLETED IAW CNSF REQUIREMENTS.
- 25 OF 25 AT/FP COMMUNICATION RADIOS WERE NOT ONBOARD.
- CARGO AMMUNITION MAGAZINE NR 3 PRP VALVE NR 2 AND PNEUMATIC SYSTEM FAILED TO HOLD REQUIRED AIR PRESSURE (CORRECTED).  
SPRINKLING ALARM (FH CIRCUIT) AND MAGAZINE HIGH TEMP ALARM (F CIRCUIT) WERE INOP.
- AN/SLQ-25A NIXIE PORT FOTC HAD SIGNIFICANT RADIAL CRACKING/DAMAGE.
- AN/SPQ-9B WAVEGUIDES DID NOT HAVE REQUIRED AIR PRESSURE GAGES

INSTALLED. SYSTEM PMS MRC 2W-2 CAN NOT BE COMPLETED AS WRITTEN BECAUSE OF INSTALLATION DEFICIENCY.

I. NAVIGATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78):

- AN/UQN-4 ELECTRONIC KEYING SWITCH WAS MISSING (CORRECTED).
- HELM, CENTERLINE, PORT AND STBD BRIDGE WING GYRO REPEATER LIGHTS WERE INOP (HELM, CENTERLINE, AND STBD BRIDGE WING CORRECTED).
- STBD RUNNING LIGHT WAS PAINTED HAZE GREY (CORRECTED).
- WHITE STERN LIGHT WAS MOUNTED ON PORT SIDE VICE ON OR NEAR CENTERLINE IAW NSTM 422 PAR 422-1.2.3.10. UNABLE TO VERIFY ARC OF VISIBILITY AS MOUNTED. NAVIGATION LIGHT CERTIFICATION REQUEST LETTER DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUEST WAIVER OF THIS REQUIREMENT.
- GYRO REPEATER IN AFT IC WAS INOP.
- RADAR OVERLAY ON VMS 2 CONSOLE WAS INOP BECAUSE OF INCOMPATIBILITY OF INSTALLED MOTHERBOARD.
- VMS 5 CONSOLE WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY UPS (CASREP 07017).
- VMS SOFTWARE VERSION WAS NOT ECDIS-N COMPLIANT.

J. COMMUNICATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):

- 6 OF 15 AN/URC-131 HFRG BROAD BAND TRANSMITTERS WERE EITHER INOP OR DEGRADED.
- 1 OF 1 AN/URC-131 HFRG NARROW BAND TRANSMITTER HAD INTERMITTENT POWER OUT DURING TUNE OPERATION.
- 4 OF 8 AN/USC-61 DMR UHF SATCOM CHANNELS WERE INOP.
- 5 OF 16 AN/USC-61 DMR VHF CHANNELS WERE INOP.
- 11 OF 16 AN/USC-61 DMR UHF LOS CHANNELS WERE INOP AND 9 OF 16 FAILED ON AIR TESTING.
- 3 OF 3 AN/PRC-112 PORTABLE COMM RADIOS WERE EITHER INOP OR DEGRADED.
- AN/USC-38 EHF SATCOM RUBIDIUM FREQUENCY STANDARD WAS OUT OF CAL (CAL DUE OCT 2006).
- AN/USC-38 EHF SATCOM HIGH POWER AMPLIFIER CHILL WATER SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT GROUP WATER CONDUCTIVITY WAS OUT-OF-SPEC (GREATER THAN 2 MHOS).
- AN/WSC-6 SHF SATCOM REMOTE OPERATOR INTERFACE UNIT DISPLAYED A TCP DISCONNECT ERROR WHICH INHIBITED THE OPERATOR FROM UTILIZING REMOTE TERMINAL TO ACQUIRE SATELLITE.
- AN/URC-107 JTIDS LINK 16 TERMINAL WAS EXPERIENCING HIGH LOOPBACK LOSS DURING MAINTENANCE LOAD TESTING (TEST1), INDICATING A FAILURE IN RF PATH.
- NAVMACS B SIDE WAS INOP (LOSS OF REDUNDANCY).
- 3 OF 3 EPIRBS ONBOARD DID NOT MEET PMS REQUIREMENTS AND HAD EXPIRED BATTERIES (DEC 2005).
- AN/WSC-8 ANTENNA SYSTEM WAS NOT PROPERLY PROTECTED FROM SEA ENVIRONMENT BECAUSE RADOME WAS NOT ASSEMBLED CORRECTLY CAUSING MULTIPLE HOLES IN SEAMS.
- SEVERAL POWER PANELS WERE MISSING LABELS, PANEL DOORS, AND SEVERAL SPARE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE IN THE ON POSITION IN TRANSMITTER AND RADIO ROOMS.
- WITHIN AFT ADVANCED ENCLOSED MAST, SHIPS FORCE WAS UNABLE TO REACH VHF, UHF, AND DWTS ANTENNAS FOR MAINTENANCE.

K. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):

- BATTLE FORCE EMAIL WAS NOT INSTALLED.
- CENTRIX WAS NOT INSTALLED.
- ADNS SOVT WAS NOT COMPLETE.
- 1 OF 87 SWAN UPS WAS INOP (CASREP 06038), 6 WERE FAULTED AND WERE

NOT TESTED, 1 WAS MISSING, 2 FAILED LOAD TEST, AND 6 WERE DISCHARGED AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF POWER DURING FCT AND COULD NOT BE LOAD TESTED.

-SWAN UPS NR 62 WAS OOC BECAUSE OF ARCING ELECTRICAL SHORT IN UPS POWER CONTROLLER CABINET.

-1 OF 4 SWAN SIPRNET CORE SWITCHES WAS DEGRADED (CASREP 07008).

-1 OF 12 SWAN SIPRNET SERVERS WAS DEGRADED (CASREP 06065), 1 OF 12 SIPRNET SERVERS FAILED DURING THE FCT, AND 2 OF 12 SIPRNET SERVERS HAD FAILED HARD DRIVES.

-3 OF 12 SWAN NIPRNET SERVERS HAD FAILED HARD DRIVES.

-4 OF 12 SWAN NIPRNET SERVERS (NODE ROOM 4) COULD NOT BE RACKED OUT FOR MAINTENANCE BECAUSE THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE GAGE MOUNTED ON A FAN COIL UNIT BLOCKED SERVER EXTENSION.

-2 OF 2 SWAN NIPRNET TAPE BACKUP DRIVES WERE INOP (CASREP 07021).

-2 OF 5 CKT-23TV UPS WERE INOP (CASREP 07025).

L. SUPPLY/HABITABILITY MATERIAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67):

-BERTHING EMERGENCY EGRESS KICK-OUT PANELS WERE DAMAGED, OBSTRUCTED, AND NOT PROPERLY LABELED.

-TROOP OFFICER BUNKROOM (02-75-8-L) WAS BEING UTILIZED AS SHIPS COMPANY STATEROOM.

-DECK TILES THROUGHOUT BERTHING, STATEROOMS, AND PASSAGE WAYS WERE DELAMINATING, DAMAGED, LOOSE OR MISSING.

-UNAUTHORIZED BLANKETS, SLEEPING BAGS, AND OTHER BEDDING WAS PRESENT IN BERTHING COMPARTMENT AND STATEROOMS.

-BUNK SAFETY STRAPS WERE NOT INSTALLED THROUGHOUT TROOP, CREW, AND OFFICER STATEROOMS.

-17 OF 35 PIECES OF PHYSICAL FITNESS EQUIPMENT WERE NOT PROPERLY SECURED FOR SEA.

-8 OF 9 GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD (GIH) SYSTEMS WERE INOP.

-GIH WASHDOWN SYSTEM WAS INOP.

-5 OF 9 GIH THERMOSTATIC FAIL SAFE SWITCHES WERE OUT OF CAL.

-CREWS GALLEY PORT SIDE ENTRANCE FIRE TOGGLE SWITCH WAS BROKEN, REMOVED AND WIRES TAPED TOGETHER TO COMPLETE CIRCUIT.

-5 OF 9 GIH THERMOSTATIC FAIL SAFE SWITCHES WERE INACCESSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE AND TESTING.

-16 POUND VIP DRYER WAS INOP AND DID NOT HAVE A PRIMARY LINT FILTER AND EXHAUST GAUGE INSTALLED. THE DRYER INSTALLED IS AN APPROVED MODEL FOR SUBMARINES BUT UNAUTHORIZED FOR SURFACE SHIPS.

-LAUNDRY EXHAUST VENTILATION WAS INOP.

-2 OF 2 150 POUND WASHERS 24 VOLT JUNCTION BOX COVER SCREWS WERE MISSING.

-1 OF 4 MESSDECKS REACH-IN REEFERS WAS INOP.

-1 OF 2 MESSDECKS SELF-SERVE ICE MACHINES WAS INOP.

-SINGLE TANK AND TRAY MULTI-TANK SCULLERY DISHWASHERS WERE INOP.

-WARDROOM SELF-SERVE ICE MACHINE WAS INOP.

-WARDROOM ICE CREAM MACHINE WAS INOP.

-CPO MESS COFFEE MACHINE WAS INOP.

-2 OF 5 CREWS GALLEY STEAM JACKET KETTLES WERE INOP.

-CREWS GALLEY FREEZER WAS INOP.

-3 OF 14 CREWS GALLEY OVENS WERE INOP.

-6 OF 22 FOOD SERVICE SERVING LINE HOT WELLS WERE INOP.

-3 OF 11 CREWS GALLEY REACH-IN REEFERS WERE INOP.

-60 POUND WASHER EXTRACTOR WAS INOP.

-1 OF 9 PRESSES WAS INOP.

-2 OF 5 50 POUND DRYERS WERE INOP.

-4 OF 4 FOOD SERVICE SPRAY WASHING UNITS WERE INOP.

-CREWS GALLEY MEAT TENDERIZER WAS INOP.

M. NAVOSH: SAT (SCORE: 0.89):

-6 OF 15 TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT CONSTRUCTED AND INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVSEA DWG 804-5184163.

-5 OF 6 INSTALLED FLAMMABLE STORAGE CABINETS HAD MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES.

-LOOSE AND WARPED FLOOR TILES THROUGHOUT THE SHIP PRESENTED SLIP AND TRIP HAZARDS.

-MORGUE FREEZER WAS INOP.

-BLOOD BANK HAD MISSING SHELVES.

-SECURE FOR SEA DEVICES THROUGHOUT ALL MEDICAL SPACES WERE MISSING.

-MEDICAL STOWAGE FOR SUPPLIES AND MEDICAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WAS INADEQUATE.

N. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):

-22 OF 32 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPECS.

-35 OF 93 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPECS.

O. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):

-FWD VCHT RM VCHT FLOODING ALARM WAS INOP.

-AFT VCHT RM GRAY WATER FLOODING ALARM WAS INOP.

-PHONE CIRCUITS WERE INOP AT THE FWD STBD AND PORT CHT RISERS.

-NR 1B GRAY WATER DISCHARGE PUMP WAS LEAKING AT THE SEAL.

-1 OF 2 OWS WAS INOP.

-OWS MEMBRANE POLISHER OPERATION WAS NOT IN EOSS AND THE TECH MANUAL WAS NOT ONBOARD.

-NR 2 OWT PUMP WAS INOP.

-BILGE FLOODING ALARMS WERE INOP IN MMR 1 AND MMR 2.

-1 OF 2 COMPRESSED MELT UNITS WAS INOP.

P. AVIATION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59):

-FLIGHT DECK EDGE HARDWARE AND FIXTURES HAD MODERATE CORROSION.

-STATIC GROUNDING WAND CONTINUITY GROUND TEST FAILED DUE TO CORROSION.

-JP5 PUMP ROOM VENTILATION WAS INOP.

-EXCESSIVE NOISE DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS PRECLUDED SAFE AND RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS WITH INSTALLED IVCS PHONES.

-JP5 PUMP ROOM WAS MISSING SOUND PROOF COMMUNICATIONS BOOTH.

-4 OF 9 SMALL BOAT AND VEHICLE REFUELING STATIONS WERE NOT OUTFITTED WITH AEL EQUIPAGE.

-SEVERAL JP5 AVIATION FUELS OPERATIONAL SEQUENCING SYSTEM (AFOSS) DIAGRAMS AND FUELING STATION DIAGRAMMATIC PLACARDS WERE INCORRECT.

-MOUNTED BRACKETS FOR CO2 BOTTLES WITH 7 FT EXTENSIONS WERE NOT INSTALLED.

-2 OF 4 CO2 BOTTLES WITH 7 FT EXTENSIONS FOR V-22 EQUIPAGE WERE MISSING.

-VERTICAL DROP DOWN LIGHTS WERE INOP FOR STARBOARD APPROACH SPOT 1, PORT AND STARBOARD APPROACH SPOT 2.

-PORT SIDE PASSAGEWAY DOOR LEADING TO 1-122-2-L PASSAGE WAY WAS MISSING A POSITIVE LOCKING DEVICE (LATCH) FOR SECURING THE DOOR OPEN TO PASS AFFF HOSE THROUGH THE HELO HANGAR.

-WINDOW WASH DID NOT EFFECTIVELY PROVIDE COVERAGE ON AFT HELO CONTROL STATION WINDOWS.

-WINDSHIELD WIPERS DID NOT MAKE ADEQUATE CONTACT WITH HELO CONTROL

STATION WINDOWS.

- HANGAR CATWALK SAFETY RAILING WAS TOO HIGH TO SAFELY EXECUTE EQUIPMENT AND ROTOR BLADE STORAGE IN STORAGE RACKS.
- PORTABLE JP5 DEFUEL PUMP WAS MISSING HOSES AND FITTINGS.
- AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION (AFS) NR 3 EXCEEDED MAXIMUM DISCHARGE PRESSURE.
- IVCS PHONE WAS INOP IN AFS NR 3.

6. MR. G. SANFORD, DEPUTY PRESINSURV, CAPT W. GALINIS, PROGRAM MANAGER PMS 317, CAPT C. BERDAR, CSO, COMPHIBRON 6, CDR B. LEE, CO, USS SAN ANTONIO, LTJG A. STEELE, COMNAVSURFLANT N43 REP, WERE ALL PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION. CAPT M. BRANNON, COS PRESINSURV, AND CAPT T. MATTINGLY, COMNAVSURFLANT N43, WERE PRESENT FOR THE OUT-BRIEF. CAPT T. D. HOLMAN WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR.

7. RADM M. NOWAKOWSKI, PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//

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